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This paper extends previous work on the identiﬁcation of search models in which observed
worker productivity is imperfectly observed. In particular, it establishes that these models
remain identiﬁed even when employment histories are left-censored (i.e. we do not get to follow
workers from their initial job out of unemployment), as well as when workers set diﬀerent reser-
vation wages from one another. We further show that allowing for heterogeneity in reservation
can aﬀect the empirical estimates we obtain, speciﬁcally estimates of the rate at which workers
receive job oﬀers.
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This paper derives new results on the identiﬁcation of job search models with imperfectly measured
worker productivity. Various authors have argued that search models are helpful for understanding
labor markets, especially for young workers who are still in the beginning stages of their careers.
According to these models, a worker’s wage depends on which random employers he happened to
meet, along with his own productivity. We are interested in whether the key elements of these
models can be identiﬁed when worker productivity is not perfectly observable. That is, can we
infer the distribution of wages a worker of given productivity could earn on various jobs? Can we
infer the rate at which workers receive oﬀers from how often they choose to change jobs?
There are several applications that require recovering these objects. For example, various search
models imply that the distribution of wages available to workers reﬂects underlying heterogeneity
in productivity across producers (where less productive employers can still compete given search
frictions). In this case, the distribution of wages reveals the degree of productive ineﬃciency
across employers, which we can then use to evaluate the eﬀects of macro shocks or policy changes
on aggregate productivity. As another example, these estimates make it possible to quantify the
role of mobility in wage growth and distinguish it f r o mt h er o l eo fe x p e r i e n c ew h i c hm a k e sw o r k e r s
more productive. We can also examine whether workers in diﬀerent job markets face diﬀerent
wage distributions and opportunities for job mobility.
As previous authors pointed out, identifying search models is straightforward when worker pro-
ductivity is relatively homogeneous or else perfectly observable. In these cases, we can recover the
distribution of wages for workers of given productivity from the empirical distribution of wages
among such workers on their ﬁrst job out of unemployment. To infer the rate at which workers
receive oﬀers, we can look at how the duration of a job varies with its wage. Intuitively, since
lower oﬀers are easier to beat, workers who draw low wages will leave more quickly, at a rate that
depends in a precise way on the distribution of wages oﬀered and how frequently oﬀers arrive.
Once we acknowledge that worker productivity is hard to measure, though, this approach no
longer applies. For one thing, we can no longerd e t e r m i n ew h e t h e rd i s p e r s i o ni nw a g e si nt h eﬁrst
job out of unemployment reﬂects dispersion in worker ability or in the prices employers pay. Yet
it is important that we be able to distinguish the two. For example, as noted by Flinn (2002) and
Bowlus and Robin (2004), whether mobility can alleviate long-run earnings inequality ultimately
depends on the source of dispersion: if wage diﬀerentials were due to price dispersion, increasing
mobility would allow workers who drew low initial oﬀers to catch up to those who drew high oﬀers;
1if wage diﬀerentials instead reﬂected diﬀerences in ability, increasing mobility would have no eﬀect
on inequality. Moreover, if we cannot tell whether a worker earning a low wage is less productive
or just happened to meet a low paying employer, we will not be able to use the fact that workers
tend to leave lower paying jobs more quickly to recover the rate at which oﬀers arrive.
One way to cope with unobserved worker productivity is to impose parametric restrictions on
the distribution of prices and unobserved abilities. However, since the conclusions we draw will
be sensitive to these restrictions, we would like to know whether we can estimate these models
without imposing them. At the very least, establishing that the model is identiﬁed can suggest
ways of testing particular functional forms before incorporating them in parametric estimation.
Work by Nagaraja and Barlevy (2003) and Barlevy (2005) demonstrated that these models can
be identiﬁed without requiring parametric assumptions. The insight in these papers is to use an
approach similar to the one used for nonparametric identiﬁcation of auction models, e.g. Athey
and Haile (2002). Intuitively, the wages on diﬀerent jobs a worker accepts represent extreme values
among the oﬀers he received, much like winning bids in auctions represent extreme values among
the bids tendered. Fortunately, extreme values often characterize the distributions of variables
from which these extremes are taken. Yet while the approach in the auction literature is static
and concerns extremes among bids already submitted at some point in time, search models require
a dynamic approach that involves following a worker over time and keeping track of how often
he changes jobs and how his wages rise with mobility. Formally, these papers rely on results for
record statistics rather than order statistics. One can show that the distribution of wages available
to a worker of given ability can be identiﬁed from the way average wage gains of job changers vary
with past mobility (i.e. the average gaps between diﬀerent consecutive record values) rather than
from the distribution of wages on the ﬁrst job out of unemployment. Similarly, the rate at which
workers receive oﬀers can be identiﬁed from the number of jobs between unemployment spells (i.e.
the number of record values) rather than by relating the duration of a job to its wage.
Unfortunately, the identiﬁcation results cited above rely on various assumptions on both the
model and the data used for identiﬁcation. One such assumption is that when we ﬁrst observe a
worker, his wage represents a random draw from the distribution of wages a worker of his ability
could earn. However, there are various relevant scenarios in which this assumption will be violated.
For example, some datasets interview workers who are already employed at the time the survey
began. In this case, the wage on the ﬁrst job we observe for a worker is not a random draw from
the distribution of wages a worker of his ability could earn, since some workers who drew low wages
for their ﬁrst job out of unemployment are likely to have moved on to a higher wage job before
we ﬁrst observe them. Restricting attention only to workers who leave unemployment within
2the survey window dramatically reduces sample sizes and makes identiﬁcation impractical. As
another example, suppose we do get to observe workers as of their ﬁrst job out of unemployment,
but workers value leisure diﬀerently and therefore set diﬀerent reservation wages. In that case, a
worker’s wage on his ﬁrst job will typically be drawn not from the distribution of wages a worker
of his ability could earn, but from a truncated version of this distribution.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we establish that these models remain identiﬁed
even in the face of such initial condition problems, i.e. situations in which the wage on the initial
job we observe for a worker is not a random draw from the distribution of wages a worker of
equal ability could earn. Second, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), we show that allowing for heterogeneity in reservation wages can aﬀect inference. In
particular, allowing for heterogeneity in reservation prices leads us to estimate a much higher
rate at which employed workers receive oﬀers in the NLSY than if we assume all workers share
the same reservation price. This result is due to certain distinguishing features of the empirical
distribution of the number of consecutive job-to-job transitions, patterns which previous research
has overlooked. Interestingly, our estimate for the rate at which employed workers receive oﬀers
when we accommodate heterogeneity in reservation wages is on par with what previous authors
have found using job duration data, although our estimate for the rate at which unemployed
workers receive oﬀers is much larger than previous authors have estimated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the search model we use. Section 2
derives the analytical results we require for identiﬁcation. Section 3 applies our results to the case
of left-censored work histories. Section 4 considers the case of unobserved diﬀerences in reservation
prices across workers. In Section 5, we discuss the eﬀects of heterogeneity in reservation prices
on empirical estimates of mobility. Section 6 comments on the implications of heterogeneity in
reservation prices for empirical estimates of the price oﬀer distribution. We conclude in Section 7.
1. A Model of On-the-Job Search
There is already a vast literature on estimating search models using data from worker histories;
for a recent survey of this literature, see Eckstein and van den Berg (2005). We follow previous
authors in modeling search as a process in which workers periodically draw a ﬁxed price from some
distribution and choose optimally among the oﬀers available at each point in time. However, we
also allow a worker’s productivity to vary over time, in a way that the econometrician may not be
able to measure. This feature allows the model to be consistent with two facts that a model with
ﬁxed productivity would be unable to match. First, real wages tend to vary over the course of a
3job, which cannot occur in our model if both the price on the job and the worker’s productivity
are constant. Second, workers occasionally earn less on a job they move to voluntarily than on the
job they left. This could occur if the worker’s productivity fell just when he happened to change
jobs, but not if his productivity were constant over time. Our assumption thus plays the same role
as measurement error in previous work.1 But unlike previous work which modeled measurement
error as a sequence of i.i.d. normal random variables, under our interpretation it is less obvious
how to model unmeasured variation in wages, which motivates our nonparametric approach.
We begin with a description of workers. All workers supply a homogeneous labor input, but
the amount they supply varies across workers and over time. Let  it denote the amount of labor
worker i can supply per hour at date t. This amount is observable to both the employer and the
worker, but is only imperfectly observable to the econometrician who collects data on this market.
We follow Flinn (1986) by modelling this productivity as a log-linear function:
 it =e x p( βXit + φi + εit) (1.1)
The ﬁrst term, Xit, represents characteristics of individual i that are observable to the econome-
trician, and β represents the returns to these characteristics. The next term, φi,i sﬁxed over time,
reﬂecting variations in innate ability that make some workers consistently more productive than
others. We do not require this term to be observable to the econometrician. The last term, εit,
denotes variation in the worker’s productivity over time which cannot be directly measured, but
can also include measurement error due to misreporting.
We impose the following assumptions on εit:
Assumption 1.1: {εit}
∞
t=0 is independent of {Xit}
∞
t=0 for any ﬁxed i
Assumption 1.2: E [Ei [∆εit]] ≡ E
£R
i (εit − εi,t−1)di
¤
=0for all dates t
Assumption 1.1 states that the observable and unobservable components of an individual’s pro-
ductivity are independent. The role of this assumption will become clear below. Assumption 1.2
states that if we were to average the change in εit across all workers, the unconditional expecta-
tion of this average would equal zero. This assumption is essentially a normalization; in general,
1That is, in our model a voluntary job changer will report a wage cut solely because of how wages are measured,
not because he moved to a lower paying job. There are search models in which workers choose to accept lower paying
jobs; one example is Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), in which workers accept a lower wage from a more productive
employer, correctly anticipating higher wage growth with such an employer. But their model also requires wages be
imperfectly measured to accord with the fact that wages both rise and fall over the duration of a job. Of course,





is a function of t, and we can always include a semiparametric function of t in Xit
to yield a residual that satisﬁes Assumption 1.2. Note that we impose no restrictions on the
distribution of εit, how its variance varies over time or across individuals, or its autocorrelation.
At each point in time, a worker can be classiﬁed as either employed or unemployed. He can
produce bi it units of output per hour while unemployed, where bi is ﬁxed over time and represents
either productivity in the home sector or the marginal value of leisure. Assuming this value
is proportional to  it allows us to abstract from selection among employed workers. Without
this assumption, workers who became less productive on the job but not at home would opt
out of the labor market to enjoy leisure, and the distribution of changes in productivity ∆ it of
employed workers would not be representative of the changes among all workers. In support of this
assumption, we note that recent work by Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2004) allowed for selection
in a similar model but found it to have a negligible impact on overall ﬁt. Nagaraja and Barlevy
(2003) and Barlevy (2005) assume bi = b for all i. One of the goals of this paper is to relax this
assumption, although for purposes of exposition we occasionally invoke it as well.
While unemployed, a worker receives job oﬀers at rate λ0 per unit time. If he accepts an oﬀer
and becomes employed, he continues to receive oﬀers at a (possibly diﬀerent) rate λ1. In addition,
he may be forced to leave his job, an event that occurs at rate δ. We assume a worker cannot
recall oﬀers he turned down, so a worker who loses his job becomes unemployed.
While working on a job, a worker supplies all of his labor to produce ﬁnal goods using a linear
technology speciﬁct ot h a tj o b . L e tzij denote the productivity of worker i on job j.T h u s , h e
will produce zij it units of output per hour. We assume zij on any match is ﬁxed over time. This
assumption eﬀectively rules out match speciﬁc human capital; if a worker becomes more productive
on one job, it must reﬂect changes in  it that by construction carry over to all jobs. Barlevy (2005)
argues this speciﬁcation is empirically plausible for young workers, since most of the wage growth
of young workers on a job does appear to carry over to other jobs as well.
Let Γi (·) denote the cdf of productivity zij for worker i across all jobs. We assume Γi (·)=Γ(·)
for all i, i.e. all workers face the same production possibilities. This assumption naturally follows
if we assume zij = zj for all i, i.e. productivity is job-speciﬁc rather than match-speciﬁc. We
appeal to this assumption for simplicity. However, it is not essential to interpret the model this
way. For example, Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), Barlevy (2002), and Gautier, Teulings, and van
Vuuren (2005) develop models in which workers enjoy a comparative advantage on diﬀerent jobs
rather than being all best suited to the same job, but the symmetry of those models ensures the
distribution of productivity across jobs is the same for all workers.
5Upon meeting, a worker and employer observe match productivity z, and the latter makes an oﬀer
to the former. The exact nature of the oﬀer will depend on how workers and employers interact.
For the most part, we focus on models in which this interaction implies that all employers with
the same zj will oﬀer in equilibrium the same constant price wj per unit labor, independently of
that worker’s productivity  it. The hourly wage for the worker is hence
Wijt = wj it (1.2)
Under this assumption, jobs can be ranked according to the price they pay, and workers will seek
out higher paying jobs, just as in the traditional search model with ﬁxed worker productivity. One
model that is consistent with (1.2) is the Lucas and Prescott (1974) model, modiﬁed to allow for
on-the-job search. In that model, employers are located on islands. Workers can instantly move
between employers on an island, and all employers on the same island are equally productive.
Competition on an island will drive employers to pay workers their marginal product, i.e. wj = zj.
Productivity is not the same across islands, but workers only get to visit other islands at random
times. In an appendix, we show that our framework also corresponds to a model in which workers
cannot instantly move to other equally productiv ee m p l o y e r s ,a n dm u s ti n s t e a db a r g a i nw i t ht h e i r
employer over the wage they earn according to a particular bargaining protocol.
Although the distinguishing feature of a job is its productivity, in the models we consider a job
can also be characterized by the wage it pays. Let F (·) denote the distribution of wages across all
jobs. From the worker’s perspective, each encounter with an employer represents an independent
draw from F (·) that does not depend on his current productivity  it. Given our assumptions, all
workers face the same F (·). In practice, workers with diﬀerent skills may direct their search to
diﬀerent labor markets. However, as long as these skills are observable, we can always carry out
our analysis for each skill group separately. Although we shall focus on identifying F (·), in certain
c a s e sw ew i l lb ea b l et om a pF (·) into a distribution of productivity Γ(·).2
What is the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral worker who discounts the future at rate ρ and
whose objective is to maximize the present discounted value of his earnings? Once he is employed,
it is clearly optimal for him to only accept a new oﬀer if it pays a higher price than his current
job. While unemployed, he must decide at what price it is better to work and continue searching
at rate λ1 than to remain unemployed and search at rate λ0. This problem has a well known
2Recovering Γ(·) from F (·) is analogous to recovering the distribution of valuations from the distribution of bids
in an auction. The Lucas and Prescott model resembles a second-price auction, since in equilibrium employers bid
zj, the amount at which they value a worker (but unlike the second-price auction, they also pay what they bid).
In other models, a ﬁrm’s oﬀer will be some function of zj. In that case, recovering Γ(·) from F (·) can be more
involved, just as mapping bids into valuations is more involved for ﬁrst-price auctions than second-price auctions.
6solution. As demonstrated, among others, by Mortensen and Neumann (1988), the optimal policy
for the worker is to set a reservation price w∗
i that solves
w∗




1 − F (x)
ρ + δ + λ1 (1 − F (x))
dx (1.3)
If λ0 = λ1, the worker should work at any price that exceeds bi.I f i n s t e a d λ0 >λ 1,t h ew o r k e r
should reject oﬀers slightly higher than bi and retain the option to search at a higher rate λ0.
Let us deﬁne w∗ =i n f i w∗
i as the lowest reservation price across workers. In what follows, we
will ﬁnd it convenient to assume that the lowest price on any job, w =i n f j wj = F−1 (0),i sh i g h e r
than w∗. In the wage setting models we described, this condition will automatically hold if λ0 ≥ λ1
and if the lowest productivity level z =i n f j zj exceeds the value of leisure for the worker who least
enjoys it, namely b =i n f i bi. This assumption allows us to avoid the issue of recoverability in Flinn
and Heckman (1982), i.e. that it is only possible to recover the distribution of prices below w∗ for
particular functional forms. However, this assumption is not essential, and we can talk about a
somewhat modiﬁed notion of identiﬁcation without it.3
This completes the description of the model. We wish to recover its key parameters — λ0, λ1, δ,
and F (·) — using employment history data, i.e. the hourly wage {Wijt}
∞
t=0 = {wij it}
∞
t=0 for each
worker, the duration of each job, and any occurrences of unemployment. 4 As noted earlier, we
m a yb ea b l et om a pF (·) to the distribution Γ(·), but our discussion will focus on recovering F (·).
Our approach to identiﬁcation builds on the fact that the jobs the worker accepts correspond to
“records” among the oﬀers he receives. More precisely, following Wolpin (1992), let us partition
the data for each worker into distinct employment cycles, where a cycle is deﬁned as the time
between unemployment spells. Let M denote the number of oﬀers on an employment cycle, and
let {ym}
M
m=1 denote the prices per unit labor on the respective oﬀers he receives. As demonstrated










3In particular, we can still identify the truncated distribution F (w | w ≥ w
∗) and the arrival rates λ0 (1 − F (w
∗))
and λ1 (1 − F (w
∗)) of “viable” oﬀers (i.e. those that some worker might accept) rather than F (w), λ0,a n dλ1.
4More recently, economists have assembled matched employer-employee datasets that allow us to track the wages
of all employees at the same workplace. If employers paid the same price per unit labor on all jobs, we could recover
the distribution of prices directly using employer ﬁxed eﬀects as in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). We
assume the econometrician has no access to such data. Even if such data were available, employer ﬁxed eﬀects would
not yield identiﬁcation if the price varied by job (or by match for the same job) rather than by employer.
7Deﬁne L(1) = 1, and for any integer n>1 deﬁne L(n) recursively as
L(n)=m i n
©
m : ym >y L(n−1)
ª
(1.5)
To simplify matters, suppose all workers share the same value b for bi and thus the same reservation
price w∗.S i n c ew ea s s u m e dw ≥ w∗, workers accept their ﬁrst oﬀer y1, and then any new oﬀer that
exceeds what they currently earn. Deﬁne N as the number of actual jobs the worker is employed
on in a given cycle, so that N ≤ M,a n dl e tn ∈ {1,...,N} index these jobs. Since a worker always
chooses the job oﬀering the highest price, the price on the n-th job in an employment cycle, wn,
must be given by
wn = yL(n)
In extreme-value theory, L(n) is called the n-th record time and wn is called the n-th record value.
That is, wn corresponds to the n-th time in the sequence {ym}
M
m=1 in which a value exceeds all
elements that preceded it. Hence, the prices on accepted jobs correspond to a sequence of record
values. Likewise, the number of jobs in an employment cycle N corresponds to the number of
record values in the sequence {ym}
M
m=1. For comprehensive surveys on record-value theory, see
Arnold, Balakrishnan, and Nagaraja (1998) and Nevzorov and Balakrishnan (1998). An important
distinction between our application and much of the work in these surveys is that our application
involves records from a random number of observations rather than an inﬁnite sequence {ym}
∞
m=1.
Before we turn to what is new in this paper, let us review previous work that exploits the record
structure of search models for purposes of identiﬁcation. Barlevy (2005) oﬀers the following multi-
step procedure for the special case where employment histories are not censored and all workers
share the same reservation price w∗.T h e ﬁrst step involves recovering the ratio κ1 = λ1/δ.
From (1.4), the number of oﬀers M on an employment cycle has a geometric distribution that
depends on κ1. One can show that this implies the distribution of the number of records N across
employment cycles is itself uniquely determined by the parameter κ1 (and moreover must be a
truncated Poisson). Hence, data on the number of jobs per employment cycle suﬃce for estimating
the relative rate at which employed workers receive oﬀers.
Note that we use neither wage data nor duration data to recover this ratio, in contrast to the
approach outlined in the survey by Eckstein and van den Berg (2005) which identiﬁes κ1 from data
on how the duration of the job varies with its price wj. The fact that we cannot directly infer the
price on a job wj from the hourly wage W∗
ijt = wj it does not pose a problem. Moreover, as we
reiterate below, using duration data to recover κ1 requires that we know F (·), and at this stage
we have yet to recover it. That said, we would need duration data to separately identify λ1 and δ.
8In particular, the duration of an employment cycle has an exponential distribution with hazard δ,
allowing us to recover this parameter.
The next two steps describe how to recover the oﬀer distribution F (·). We begin by taking the
log diﬀerence of the wage in (1.2)
∆lnWit =l nwn(t) − lnwn(t−1) + β∆Xit + ∆εit (1.6)
where n(t) denotes the record number of the job the worker holds at date t.F o r w o r k e r s w h o
remain on the same job at these two points in time, the price w per unit labor will be constant,
and their log-wage growth is given by
∆lnWit = β∆Xit + ∆εit (1.7)
Given Assumption 1.1, we can recover β by ordinary least squares. Next, we turn to workers who
move from their n − 1-th job in date t − 1 to their n-th job at date t. For these workers, we have
∆lnWit − β∆Xit =l n wn − lnwn−1 + ∆εit
≡ ωn − ωn−1 + ∆εit
w h e r ew eu s et h ee s t i m a t eo fβ from the previous step. Note that ωn =l n wn corresponds to
the n-th record in the sequence of log price oﬀers. Thus, net log wage growth for voluntary job
changers is just an error ridden record gap. Averaging across all workers who switch from their
n-th job to their n +1 -th job, and using the fact that wj is independent of  it,w eo b t a i n
E (∆lnWit − β∆Xit | N ≥ n)=E (ωn − ωn−1 | N ≥ n) (1.8)
This average is conditional on the there being at least n jobs in the respective employment cycle,
i . e .o nt h ee v e n tt h a tt h ew o r k e rm a d ei tt oh i sn-th job. The imputed average log wage changes









m=1 that corresponds to log price oﬀers over an employment cycle.5
These average record gaps turn out to suﬃce for recovering the shape of the oﬀer distribution. As
demonstrated by Nagaraja and Barlevy (2003) and Barlevy (2005), if M has a known geometric




yL(n) − yL(n−1) | N ≥ n
¢ª∞
n=1 from a sequence of
5While the observed log wage change for an individual ∆ω + ∆ε can be negative, average log wage changes
E (∆ω) must be positive, an implication we can test. More generally, not every nonnegative sequence corresponds
to a sequence of average record gaps from some distribution, imposing a stronger restriction on what average wage
gains can be. We do not derive the admissable set here, other than to note it is isomorphic to the set of moments
for which the related Hausdorﬀ Moment Problem described in Shohat and Tamarkin (1943) is solvable.
9i.i.d. observations {ym}
M
m=1 identify the distribution of ym up to a location shift. Using our
estimate for κ1 to pin down the distribution of M, we can map the average net wage gains (1.8)
into a unique distribution F (·) up to a scaling parameter. Intuitively, average wage growth over an
employment cycle is informative because the wage gains of workers leaving their ﬁrst job depend
more on the shape of the oﬀer distribution near its lower support than the wage gains of workers
leaving their sixth job. Tracking wage growth over an employment cycle should therefore allow us
to reconstruct the oﬀer distribution.
Several caveats are warranted regarding this identiﬁcation strategy. First, it assumes all workers
s h a r et h es a m ev a l u eo fl e i s u r ebi so that prices on each employment cycle reﬂect records from
identically distributed sequences of i.i.d. observations {ym}
M
m=1. But if workers valued leisure
diﬀerently, the price on the ﬁrst job yL(1) would be drawn from a diﬀerent truncated distribution
F (w | w ≥ w∗
i) for each worker. Another caveat is that we need to track each employment cycle
from its beginning to determine how many jobs a worker held between his last unemployment spell
and his current job. If employment cycles were censored, this approach would seem doomed. It
is therefore important to determine whether the model can remain identiﬁed when either of these
conditions is violated.
At ﬁrst, heterogeneity in reservation prices and censored employment histories might seem like
distinct problems. However, one of the points of this paper is that in both cases, the wages on an
employment cycle can be viewed as record values from an independent but not identically distrib-
uted (i.n.i.d.) sequence of observations {ym}
M
m=1,s p e c i ﬁcally one in which the ﬁrst observation y1
is distributed diﬀerently from the remaining observations. It turns out that in this case we can
continue to identify the key aspects of the model, although demonstrating this is more involved
than in the i.i.d. case. In the next section we analyze records in this setup, and in subsequent
sections we discuss censoring and heterogenous reservation prices, respectively.
2. Identiﬁcation with a Non-Identically Distributed Initial Observation
This section contains the key mathematical results we use in subsequent sections. For a more
rigorous treatment of this model, see Barlevy and Nagaraja (2005).
Let {ym}M
m=1 denote a sequence of random variables. Suppose M is a geometrically distributed
random variable that is independent of the yi,i . e .f o rm ≥ 1,
Pr(M = m)=( 1− p)
m−1 p (2.1)
10where 0 <p<1.D e ﬁne L(1) = 1 and L(n)=m i n
©
k : yk >y L(n−1)
ª
as the n-th record time,
and deﬁne wn = yL(n) for n ≥ 1 as the n-th record value. The total number of records that occur
within the sequence {ym}
M
m=1 is given by N =m a x{j : L(j) ≤ M}.
We assume {ym}M
m=1 are mutually independent and y1 is distributed according to some contin-
uous cdf G(·) while ym for m ≥ 2 is distributed according to some other continuous cdf F (·).W e
want to allow for the possibility that G(·) and F (·) are related. Thus, let us deﬁne a mapping
T from the set of continuous distribution functions into itself such that G = T (F). A mapping
like this can always be deﬁned. However, we add content to this formulation by imposing the
following assumptions on T:
Assumption 2.1: for any distribution F,i fG = T (F) , then the composite function G (u) ≡
G ◦ F−1 (u) is absolutely continuous in u ∈ (0,1).
Assumption 2.2: for any distribution F, the support of G = T (F) lies in the support of F.
Assumption 2.3: for any distribution F,i fG = T (F),t h e nF−1 (0) = G−1 (0)
Assumption 2.1 is a technical assumption that allows us to assume without loss of generality
that G(·) has a density function. Assumption 2.2 states that the ﬁrst observation y1 can only
take on values in the support of all subsequent observations. In our application, this amounts to
the assumption that the price on the ﬁrst job we observe for a worker must lie in the support of
the price oﬀer distribution. Assumption 2.3 states that the lowest possible value for y1 does not
exceed the lowest possible value for y2. If this were not the case, values from the lower support




n=1, and there would be no hope of
fully recovering F (·) from record data. Note that the identity mapping T (F)=F satisﬁes these
assumptions. Thus, the case where all observations are identically distributed that was analyzed
in Nagaraja and Barlevy (2003) and Barlevy (2005) is just a special case of the model here.
Our goal is to show that the key features of this model — the parameter p in (2.1) and the
distributions F (·) and G(·) —c a nb ei d e n t i ﬁed from record data. We begin by providing suﬃcient
conditions for the expected record gaps E
¡
yL(n) − yL(n−1) | N ≥ n
¢
to exist, since our results
employ these moments. The proof of this and other propositions is contained in an appendix.
Proposition 1: Consider a sequence of independent random variables {ym}
M
m=1 where
11(i) Pr(ym ≤ x)=F (x) for all m ≥ 2;
(ii) Pr(y1 ≤ x)=G(x) where G = T (F) satisﬁes Assumptions 2.1 — 2.3
(iii) M is independent of {ym} and Pr(M = m)=( 1− p)
m−1 p for some p ∈ (0,1).
If E (|y2|) < ∞,t h e nE (wn − wn−1 | N ≥ n) exists for all n ≥ 2,w h e r ewn = yL(n). ¥
Note that the existence of record moments for n ≥ 2 only depends on the distribution F (·),n o t
G(·). This may seem surprising at ﬁrst, since the fact that E (y2) is ﬁnite does not imply E (y1)
is ﬁnite. Indeed, if the support of F (·) is unbounded above, one can easily construct examples
that satisfy Assumptions 2.1 — 2.3 where the mean for F (·) exists but the mean for G(·) does
not. The key is that these moments are conditioned on M ≥ 2 and max{y2,...,y M} ≥ y1.F r o m
Nagaraja and Barlevy (2003), we know E (E (max{y2,...,y M}|M ≥ 2)) is ﬁnite whenever E (y2)
is. Hence, even if the unconditional mean for y1 does not exist, the mean conditional on y1 being
surpassed by a variable whose mean is ﬁnite does exist.
W eb e g i nw i t ht h ec a s ei nw h i c hT is a known mapping, as will be true of the application in
the next section. Moreover, we impose an additional assumption on T, namely that there exists a
function G0 :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] such that for any function F and any real number x,
G(x)=T (F)(x)=G0 (F (x)) (2.2)
where T (F)(x) represents the value of T (F) evaluated at x. In words, the probability that y1 <x
under G = T (F) can be expressed purely in terms of the percentile that x occupies within the
distribution F (·). Again, this will be true for our application in the next section. We now have
Proposition 2: Consider a sequence of independent random variables {ym}
M
m=1 where
(i) Pr(ym ≤ x)=F (x) for all m ≥ 2;
(ii) Pr(y1 ≤ x)=G0 (F (x)) where G0 :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is non-decreasing and onto
(iii) M is independent of {ym} and Pr(M = m)=( 1− p)
m−1 p for some p ∈ (0,1).
Then we have
a. The distribution {Pr(N = n)}
∞
n=1 identiﬁes a unique p ∈ [0,1] (which depends on G0).
b. If E (|y2|) < ∞,t h e n{E (wn − wn−1 | N ≥ n)}
∞
n=2 uniquely characterizes F (·) for a given
p within the set of continuous distributions, up to a location shift. ¥
12Hence, given a known mapping T that satisﬁes (2.2), we can use record data to recover both the
parameter p and the distribution F (·) from which ym for m ≥ 2 i sd r a w n( a n ds i n c eT : F → G is
a known mapping, once we know F we can also deduce G). Establishing this result proves to be
considerably more diﬃcult than for the i.i.d. case. In particular, our proof hinges on a relatively
obscure result in convolution theory due to Titchmarsh (1926) that would not be required if the
observations {ym}
M
m=1 were instead i.i.d.6
We next consider the case in which the mapping T is unknown, but is still assumed to satisfy
Assumptions 2.1 — 2.3. In this case, we establish the following result:
Proposition 3: Consider a sequence of independent random variables {ym}
M
m=1 where
(i) Pr(ym ≤ x)=F (x) for all m ≥ 2;
(ii) Pr(y1 ≤ x)=G(x) where G(x) is compatible with Assumptions 2.1 — 2.3
(iii) M is independent of {ym} and Pr(M = m)=( 1− p)
m−1 p for some p ∈ (0,1).
If E (|y2|) < ∞,t h e n{Pr(N = n)}
∞
n=1 and {E (wn − wn−1 | N ≥ n)}
∞
n=2 uniquely determine p
and identify F (·) up to a location shift and its associated G = T (F). ¥
In other words, given two arbitrary distributions G(·) and F (·) that comply with Assumptions
2.1 — 2.3, we can use record data to infer the shape of the two distributions as well as p.M o r e
precisely, the distribution {Pr(N = n)}
∞
n=1 identiﬁes p and the distribution G(·) relative to F (·),
i.e. the composite function G (u) ≡ G◦F−1 (u) for all u ∈ (0,1). Intuitively, the number of records
that we will observe in a typical sequence depends on how many observations there are (hence
p) and how much weight G(·) assigns to values near the upper support of F (·) that are hard to
improve upon. Given p and G (u), the expected record gaps can then be used to determine the
shape of F (·). By substituting F (·) into G (u), we can obtain the distribution G(·).
3. Censored Employment Histories
As a ﬁrst application of our results, we turn to the case of censored employment histories. The
problem of censoring is highly relevant for empirical applications. For example, in applying the
insights of record statistics to analyze actual wage data, Barlevy (2005) was forced to turn to
6In the i.i.d. case, characterization results can be instead derived using the more well-known Müntz-Szász theorem.
See Kamps (1998) for a survey of applications of the Müntz-Szász theorem to order statistics.
13the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) dataset to obtain suﬃciently complete work
histories. One limitation of the NLSY is that it is not a particularly large sample, and thus yields
too few observations to accurately estimate the average net wage gains beyond the third job in an
employment cycle. The limited sample size also precludes implementing the approach separately
for diﬀerent groups of workers, making it impossible to explore such questions as whether the oﬀer
distribution and the rate at which oﬀers arrive diﬀer for blacks and whites. Larger panel datasets
are available, such as the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
but most respondents in these surveys are already employed at the time of their ﬁrst interview. In
other words, employment cycles are left-censored. As a result, whenever a worker we track changes
jobs, we don’t know how many jobs he previously worked on. We could of course wait until the
worker happens to become unemployed, but this would force us to throw out much of the data.
Developing a strategy for identiﬁcation that can use censored employment cycles is essential for
exploiting the larger sample sizes of existing datasets.
For now, let us assume as in Nagaraja and Barlevy (2003) or Barlevy (2005) that all workers
share the same value of leisure b and hence the same reservation price w∗.B u t i n c o n t r a s t t o
these papers, suppose we only get to observe a random sample of already-employed workers. The
problem with implementing the procedure outlined in Section 1 is that we no longer know what
position in its respective employment cycle any job in the data represents. However, we can make
use of an important feature of the labor market we consider, namely that it converges to a steady
state in which both the employment rate and the distribution of employed workers across prices is
constant over time. Let u denote the fraction of workers who are unemployed in steady state, and
let G(w) denote the fraction of employed workers who are paid no more than w per unit labor.
Since both expressions are constant over time, and using the fact that unemployed workers will
accept any oﬀer they receive given our assumption that w = F−1 (0) ≥ w∗,w eh a v e
du/dt = −λ0u + δ (1 − u)=0
dG(w)/dt = λ0F (w)
u
1 − u
− [δ + λ1 (1 − F (w))]G(w)=0
Solving these two equations yields the following expression for the steady state distribution of
prices across employed workers
G(w)=
F (w)
1+κ1 (1 − F (w))
(3.1)
where recall κ1 = λ1/δ. This distribution ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F (·),r e ﬂecting the
fact that workers gravitate to higher paying jobs. Since some already-employed workers will have
m o v e do nt oj o b st h a tp a ym o r et h a nt h eﬁrst job they were oﬀered, we will observe more workers
at high price jobs than in a random sample of workers on their ﬁrst job out of unemployment.
14Suppose we chose a worker at random among all employed workers, and denote by y1 the price
on the ﬁrst job we observe him on. If workers have been active in the labor market for some time,
then y1 represents an independent draw from a distribution approximately equal to the steady
state distribution G(·) above. Let M − 1 denote the number of oﬀers a worker receives from the
time we ﬁrst observe him until he is next laid oﬀ, and let us refer to these oﬀers as y2 through yM
according to the order they arrive. It is easy to show that the number of oﬀers from now until he
is laid oﬀ has the identical geometric distribution as in (1.4). Hence, M is geometric. The price
oﬀers ym for m ≥ 2 are drawn from F (·) and are independent of one another and of y1.
It can be veriﬁed that the mapping T : F → G deﬁned by (3.1) is consistent with Assumptions
2.1 — 2.3. Moreover, G(w)=G0 (F (w)),w h e r eG0 (y)=y[1 + κ1 (1 − y)]
−1.A sl o n ga st h el o g
price oﬀer distribution has a ﬁnite mean, we satisfy all of the requirements of Proposition 2 above.
We can therefore use the distribution of the number of jobs N from when we ﬁrst observe a worker
until he is eventually laid oﬀ to recover κ1.








(1 + κ1 (1 − u))
3du (3.2)
We can therefore recover κ1 from the empirical distribution of the number of jobs per left-censored
employment cycle using maximum likelihood, i.e. by choosing κ1 to maximize the likelihood of
the observed values of N across employment cycles under (3.2). Once we have an estimate for κ1,
Proposition 2 tells us we can use the net wage gains of voluntary job changers to recover the oﬀer
distribution F (·) up to a scaling parameter. Let n denote the number of job changes we observe
for the worker since his ﬁrst survey. The average net wage gains E (∆lnWit − β∆Xit | N ≥ n)
then correspond to the sequence of moments E
¡
yL(n) − yL(n−1) | N ≥ n
¢
among log price oﬀers
{ym}
M
m=1, and by Proposition 2 these moments characterize the distribution of y2. While this
two-step approach is similar to the one described earlier for complete cycles, the way we map the
underlying data to values for κ1 and F (·) will be diﬀerent and will depend on the function G0 (·)
implicit in (3.1).
At this point, we should mention earlier work by Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (2000) who
also argue that this model can be nonparametrically identiﬁed when we only get to observe workers
who are already employed. However, unlike this paper, they assumed no measurement error and
no unobserved worker productivity. This allowed them to pursue a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy
from the one described above. It will be useful to compare the two approaches to understand the
diﬃculties posed by the presence of unobserved worker productivity.
15When worker productivity is perfectly observable, we can deduce the price w on each job. Given
this, Bontemps et al note that we can directly recover G(·) from the empirical distribution of
prices among already-employed workers, assuming these workers have been active in the market





Just as with our approach, their approach requires an estimate for κ1 to recover F (·).B u t
rather than estimating κ1 from the number of jobs a worker passes through before he is next laid
oﬀ, Bontemps et al turn to job duration data. Since a job ends if either the worker is sent into
unemployment or receives a better oﬀer, a job oﬀering a price w ends with hazard δ+λ1 (1 − F (w)).
Substituting in (3.3), this becomes
λ1 (1 + κ1)
κ1 (1 + κ1G(w))
As long as one can estimate the hazard for at least two diﬀerent values of w,i tw i l lb ep o s s i b l et o
separately estimate λ1 and κ1. This provides them with the parameter κ1 of interest, as well as
separate estimates for λ1 and δ = λ1/κ1.
Once we allow for the possibility that worker productivity cannot be perfectly measured, though,
t h ea p p r o a c hp r o p o s e db yB o n t e m p set al no longer works. First and foremost, the distribution
of observed wages W = w  in a random sample of employed workers no longer corresponds to
G(·), but to a convolution of G(·) and the distribution of worker ability. Without additional
assumptions on unobserved worker productivity, we cannot recover G(·) from a cross sectional
wage distribution. Second, even if G(·) were known, the fact that we cannot directly observe the
price w makes it impossible to exploit the variation between job duration and w to identify κ1.
The virtue of recovering κ1 from longitudinal data on the number of jobs per employment cycle is
that we do not need to know either the distribution G(·) or the true price on each job.
Interestingly, the fact that it is possible to recover κ1 without relying on wage data suggests our
approach can be used in models where the price per unit labor is not constant over the course
of the job as we have assumed. For example, consider the Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) model,
which uses the same production structure as here but assumes a diﬀerent wage setting mechanism.
They assume employers post wages, but can then increase the wage if their employee receives an
outside oﬀer. An implication of their model is that workers always prefer an employer who is more
productive to one who is less productive. This implies the number of jobs is the number of records
in the sequence {Zm}
M
m=1 where Zm denotes the productivity of the m-th oﬀer and M denotes the
number of oﬀers in an employment cycle. We can therefore use the number of jobs per employment
16cycle can to identify κ1. This is true even though wages no longer correspond to record values: a
worker might agree to a lower wage from a more productive employer, correctly anticipating that
wage growth will be higher with this employer. By contrast, it will not be possible to recover κ1
using wage and duration data as described above. However, a similar approach would work if we
could observe z, since a job with productivity z will end with a hazard rate of δ + λ1 (1 − Γ(z)).7
Another diﬀerence between our approach and the one proposed by Bontemps et al is that their
strategy requires that equation (3.1) holds, whe r e a so u ra p p r o a c hd o e sn o t .T h i si sb e c a u s et h e
approach advocated by Bontemps et al proceeds by ﬁrst estimating G(·) and then using a known
mapping from G(·) to F (·) to deduce F (·). By contrast, our approach remains valid even if G(·)
is unknown, since we identify F (·) from the evolution of log wage growth over an employment
cycle, not by mapping an estimate of G(·) into an implied estimate of F (·). Formally, according
to Proposition 3 we can identify F (·) when T : F → G is unknown.
While our approach has the advantage that it does not require knowing how G(·) and F (·) are
related, its main drawback is that it is far more data intensive: we need to track workers to the
end of their employment cycle, whereas Bontemps et al only need data on one job per worker.
However, tracking each employment cycle to its very end is only necessitated by our assumption
of unobservable productivity. If worker productivity were observable, we could separately identify
G(·) and F (·) without as much data. Suppose we collected data on w1 and w2, the price per
unit labor on the ﬁrst and second jobs we observe for a worker, as well as the duration of the ﬁrst
job. As in Bontemps et al, we could use the empirical distribution of w1 to recover G(·) and the
relationship between the duration of the job and its price to recover λ1 and δ. But rather than rely
on (3.1) to infer F (·) from G(·), we can recover F (·) directly given estimates of κ1 and G(·) by
using the fact that the empirical distribution of w2 corresponds to the distribution of the second
record from {ym}
M
m=1 conditional on at the occurrence of a second record. We would need to track
workers beyond the ﬁrst job we see them on, but not to the end of their employment cycle.
4. Heterogeneity in Reservation Prices
So far, we have maintained the assumption that all workers share the same value of leisure b.I nt h i s
section we relax this assumption. Formally, let Υ(·) denote the cdf of bi across individuals. Given
the implicit formula for w∗
i in (1.3), Υ(·) c a nb em a p p e di n t oad i s t r i b u t i o nH (·) for reservation
7Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) appeal to precisely this strategy. Using matched employer-employee data, they
estimate the productivity of each ﬁrm by the average wage of all workers at the same location. This approach is
valid so long as all jobs with the same employer are equally productive.
17prices w∗
i across all workers. As before, we assume that the least selective worker would be willing
to accept any oﬀer, i.e. w∗ = H−1 (0) ≤ F−1 (0) = w. Let us deﬁne Hu (·) as the distribution of
w∗
i across unemployed workers. This distribution will diﬀer from the distribution of reservation
prices in the population, since workers with high reservation prices are less likely to move into
employment and thus more likely to be unemployed at a given point in time. We show that it
is possible to nonparametrically identify both the oﬀer distribution F (·) and the distribution of
reservation prices among the unemployed Hu (·). Under additional assumptions, it will also be
possible to reconstruct H (·) and Υ(·). Throughout this section, we assume the econometrician
has access to complete employment histories.
Suppose we tracked an unemployed worker chosen at random and recorded the price on the ﬁrst
job that worker accepted. Let us call this price y1.H o w i s y1 distributed? We can view y1 as
a random draw w from F (·) known to exceed the value of an independent draw w∗ from Hu (·).
Hence, its distribution is just the distribution of w conditional on the event that w ≥ w∗,i . e .
Pr(y1 ≤ x)=P r( w ≤ x | w ≥ w∗)=
Pr(w∗ ≤ w ≤ x)
Pr(w∗ ≤ w)
One can show that Pr(w∗ ≤ w ≤ x)=
R x
−∞ Hu (w)dF (w) and Pr(w ≥ w∗)=
R ∞
−∞ Hu (w)dF (w).
Hence, if we let G(x) denote the cdf for y1,t h e n
G(x)=
R x
−∞ Hu (w)dF (w)
R ∞
−∞ Hu (w)dF (w)
(4.1)









0 Hu (F−1 (y))dy
(4.2)
As before, denote additional price oﬀers over the course of an employment cycle by {y2,...,y M}.
The prices on the jobs the worker accepts represent records from the sequence {ym}
M
m=1,w h e r e
y1 is distributed according to (4.1) while ym for m ≥ 2 is distributed according to F (·).I t
easy to verify that G(x) satisﬁes Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. Assumption 2.3 follows directly from
our assumption that F−1 (0) ≥ H−1 (0) = w∗. However, as evident from (4.2), G(x) cannot be
expressed as a function of F (x) alone, since G(x) depends on F (y) for all y ≤ x . We therefore
appeal to Proposition 3, which allows G(·) to be an unknown function.
According to Proposition 3, we can use the distribution of the number of jobs N per employ-
ment cycle to recover κ1 and the composite function G (u) ≡ G ◦ F−1 (u).L e t n denote the
number of jobs the worker has held since he was last unemployed. The average net wage gains
18E (∆lnWit − β∆Xit | N ≥ n) across all workers correspond to the sequence of expected record
gaps E
¡
yL(n) − yL(n−1) | N ≥ n
¢
among the log price oﬀers the worker receives. Proposition 3
states that, given κ1 and G (u), these moments uniquely determine the log price oﬀer distribution
up to a location shift, and hence the oﬀer distribution F (·) up to a scaling parameter. Thus, even
though the sequence of prices over an employment cycle {wn}
N
n=1 will be distributed diﬀerently
for workers with diﬀerent reservation prices, we can still recover F (·) from the average wage gains
across all job changers who are at the same position in their respective employment cycle.
Once we know F (·), we can substitute it into our original estimate for G (u) to recover G(·),
the distribution of the price on the starting job across . Although G(·) itself may not be of direct
interest, recovering G(·) is a ﬁrst step towards recovering objects that are of inherent interest,
such as the distribution of reservation prices Hu (·) across unemployed workers, the distribution
of reservation prices H (·) across all workers, and the distribution of the value of leisure Υ(·).F o r
certain applications, it is important that we be able to estimate these distributions. For example,
one feature of U.S. labor markets is that many unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs relatively quickly.
This could be because most workers are not very choosy and accept any oﬀer that comes their
way, or because search frictions for unemployed workers are small (i.e. λ0 is large) and even choosy
workers can quickly ﬁnd jobs they are willing to take. The distribution of reservation prices among
unemployed workers Hu (·) can distinguish between these two explanations.
We now describe how to recover these distributions using G(·). We begin with the distribution
of reservation prices Hu (·) across unemployed workers. Intuitively, we should not expect to learn
about reservation values that do not correspond to prices oﬀered by some employers; this is because
we need data on how participation increases with the price to determine how many workers have
a given reservation value. Formally, we can only identify Hu (x) when x = F−1 (u) for some













0 Hu (F−1 (u))du
(4.3)
The left-hand side of (4.3) is just G0 (u), where recall G (u) is identiﬁed from data on the number
of jobs N per employment cycle. Since Hu (·) is a cdf, it follows that G0 (u) must be positive. This
is a testable implication of the model, since not every distribution Pr(N = n) will yield a function
G (u) that is everywhere nondecreasing.




is proportional to G0 (u) for all u ∈ (0,1).T o g e t











19This constant is not always identiﬁed, since it depends on the fraction of workers whose reservation
price exceeds the highest oﬀered price w =s u p j wj, which thus far we have not restricted.
If we assume w∗ ≤ w, an assumption that follows automatically if the oﬀer distribution F (·) has
unbounded support, then we can easily obtain the constant of proportionality. In particular, if all
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Even if we do not assume w∗ ≤ w,i . e .i ft h eF (·) we identify has bounded support, we can still
interpret (4.5) as the conditional distribution Hu (·|w∗ ≤ w), i.e. as the distribution of reservation
prices among workers whose reservation price is no higher than w.
Given an estimate for the distribution of reservation prices Hu (·) among unemployed workers,
we next set out to construct the distribution of reservation prices H (·) for the population as a
whole. For this, we need to impose additional assumptions on how the population of unemployed
workers compares to that of all workers. Let us assume that the market we consider has been
active for quite some time, so that the distribution Hu (·) is close to its steady-state value. In
steady-state, the fraction of workers with reservation price w∗ who are unemployed, which we
denote uw∗, remains constant over time. Using the law of motion for uw∗,
˙ uw∗ = −λ0 (1 − F (w∗))uw∗ + δ (1 − uw∗)
and setting the change in uw∗ to zero yields the following steady-state unemployment rate:
uw∗ =
1
1+κ0 (1 − F (w∗))
Hence, the steady state distribution of reservation prices across unemployed workers Hu (·) will be








1+κ0 (1 − F (x))
(4.6)





0 Hu (F−1 (y))dy
(4.7)
20A similar derivation for this formula can be found in Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999).
Diﬀerentiating (4.6) with respect to w yields
hu (w)u =
h(w)
1+κ0 (1 − F (w))
We can therefore derive H (·) from Hu (·).T od os o ,w eﬁrst need to estimate κ0.O n ew a yt od o
so is to use the steady-state unemployment rate u from equation (4.7) and our existing estimates
for Hu (·) to extract κ0.N e x t ,f o ra n yp r i c ex that lies in the support of the oﬀer distribution, i.e.




Hu (x) by the factor 1+κ0 (1 − F (x)). Finally, we multiply our new function by the
unemployment rate to obtain the density function h(w).
Once we recover the distribution H (·), it is fairly straightforward to obtain the distribution of
leisure Υ(·). Recall that the cutoﬀ w∗ for each worker is implicitly deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 1 . 3 ) .
Rearranging yields
w∗ = b +( κ0 − κ1)
Z ∞
w∗
1 − F (x)
ρ/δ +1+κ1 (1 − F (x))
dx (4.8)
where κ0 = λ0/δ. We already described how to estimate κ0 and κ1. The remaining parameter
w en e e di st h er a t i oo ft h ed i s c o u n tr a t eρ t ot h er a t eo fj o bl o s sδ. Recall that we can estimate
δ from the duration of employment cycles. As for ρ, under certain assumptions we should be
able to appeal to interest rate data to recover it, although this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Assuming we can assign a value to ρ, we can appeal to (4.8) to map H (·) into Υ(·).I tm i g h tb e
possible to characterize this mapping analytically, but if not, it is always possible to use simulation
methods to ﬁnd a numerical approximation for Υ(·). An example of these methods can be found
in the work on identiﬁcation in auctions by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000).
5. Empirical Application: Heterogeneity and Estimates of κ0 and κ1
Although one of our goals is to develop an identiﬁcation strategy that can be applied to new
datasets where left-censoring is a concern, in our empirical analysis we limit ourselves to the same
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) dataset already explored in previous work. This
is because we wish to gauge the consequences of relaxing the assumption adopted in some of the
aforementioned papers that workers share a common reservation price. In this section we consider
the implications of this assumption for estimates of mobility parameters, and in the next section
we consider the implications for estimates of the oﬀer distribution F (·).
Our analysis suggests that allowing for heterogeneous reservation prices can dramatically aﬀect
21the estimated rate at which workers receive oﬀers. As we discuss below, this sensitivity is driven
by two features of the empirical distribution of the number of jobs N per employment cycle: (1)
a majority of employment cycles end after only one job; (2) the distribution of N has a fat tail.
Allowing for heterogeneous reservation values gives more weight to observation (2), which in turn
leads to higher estimates for the rate at which employed workers receive oﬀers. Interestingly, these
estimates are on par with those implied by previous analysis based on duration data. However,
the distribution of reservation prices required to account for observation (1) implies that the rate
at which unemployed workers receive oﬀers is much higher than previous analysis suggests.
The reason we use the NLSY dataset is that it compiles comprehensive employment histories
for each worker in the survey for an extended period. This dataset tracks a cohort of workers
who were between ages 14 and 22 in 1979. We focus on male workers, whom we follow up to
1993, so the oldest person in our sample is 36. Although the NLSY was continued in subsequent
years, we chose not to incorporate that data, for two reasons. First, from 1994 on interviews were
conducted every two years, which as Pierret (2001) shows makes it diﬃcult to construct reliable
work histories. Second, in line with our assumptions, we want to focus on young workers who have
less incentive to invest in match-speciﬁc human capital, and age 36 seemed a reasonable cutoﬀ.
According to our analysis, all we need to estimate κ1 is the distribution of N across cycles. As in
previous work, such as Flinn (2002), we use periods of non-employment to demarcate employment
cycles. To avoid counting summer jobs for students as employment cycles, we restrict attention
to employment cycles that end when the worker has at least one year of potential experience, i.e.
he has been at least one year out of school. That is, a worker may begin an employment cycle
while still in school, but we will only include the cycle in our analysis if he remains continuously
employed beyond the point at which he ﬁnishes his schooling.
One concern about partitioning the data into employment cycles this way is that workers who
take time oﬀ before voluntarily moving into a new job — or must wait until this job starts (e.g.
teachers starting a job at a new school) — might be misclassiﬁed as starting a new employment cycle.
We therefore consider an alternative classiﬁcation proposed in Barlevy (2005) which combines data
on non-employment spells with the reason the worker provides for ending his job. In particular, a
new employment cycle is said to begin if either the worker is laid oﬀ from his job or if he spends
more than 8 weeks in non-employment. The two approaches yield distributions for N that have
similar qualitative features, and hence lead to similar estimates for κ1.
After we divide the data into employment cycles, we need to count the number of consecutive
jobs within each cycle. This raises the question of how to count dual job holdings, a relatively
22common phenomenon in the data. We follow Barlevy (2005) in ignoring jobs that begin after and
end before another job, on the grounds that these are most likely secondary jobs that supplement
income and which the worker is not interested in taking on as a primary job. Indeed, in the vast
majority of such cases, workers identify these jobs as secondary in response to survey questions.
Before turning to results, a ﬁnal issue we must contend with is that since the NLSY spans a
ﬁxed time window, we cannot track employment cycles to their end. Formally, let tk denote the
length of the k-th cycle and Tk t h et i m ef r o mw h e nt h ek-th cycle beings until the end of the
sample. Given our data, we can estimate Pr(N = n | tk ≤ Tk),n o tPr(N = n). We will therefore
oversample short employment cycles with fewer jobs. To mitigate this concern, we only consider
cycles that began in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the sample. Since the ﬁrst NLSY interview collected
retrospective data on jobs starting from 1977, this includes all cycles that started on or before 1981.
For large values of Tk, the degree of bias should be small. Indeed, among the 14,178 employment
cycles that started prior to the ﬁrst week of 1982, only 1,837 are censored (13%). Only a quarter
of these are censored because they continue beyond the last year in the survey, 1993. The rest
are censored because of attrition or because the worker did not provide a reason for leaving his
job. Nearly half of all censored cycles (835 out of 1,837) are censored within 2 years of when they
start. Censoring is therefore unlikely to generate a large bias.
Table 1 reports the distribution of N across the 12,341 complete employment cycles in our data
that began prior to 1982. The ﬁrst column partitions employment cycles by nonemployment spells.
A stark feature of the data is that the vast majority (61%) of all employment cycles end after one
job. The second column treats workers who quit and ﬁnd a job within 8 weeks as continuing in
the same employment cycle. In this case, nearly 70% of all cycles end with only one job, and the
tail of the distribution looks nearly identical. Although not reported in Table 1, this feature is
pervasive: even when we break down the analysis into four education groups, we systematically
ﬁnd that the majority of cycles end after only one job.
Armed with this data, we proceed to estimate κ1.W e ﬁrst consider what happens when we
assume all workers share the same reservation price. The top panel of Table 2 reports the maximum
likelihood estimate for κ1 under this assumption, and are in line with estimates reported in Barlevy
(2005). The parameter κ1 is tightly estimated around 1.9. The reason for this relatively low value
is the high incidence of employment cycles with only one job. Intuitively, when workers share the
same reservation price, symmetry implies that in cycles with exactly two oﬀers, half of the time
the ﬁrst oﬀer will be below the second oﬀer. The fact that few cycles result in more than one job
implies there must be few cycles in which the worker makes it to a second oﬀer. Hence, either the
rate λ1 at which oﬀe r sa r r i v ei sl o w ,o rt h er a t eδ at which cycles end is high and workers do not
23have enough time to accumulate multiple oﬀers.8 By contrast, if κ1 were in the range of 5 to 10,
in line with estimates of κ1 based on duration data that we discuss below, the expected fraction
of cycles that end after one job would be much lower, around 24 − 36%.
Next, we introduce heterogeneity in reservation prices. To appreciate why this can aﬀect the
estimates, suppose a signiﬁcant fraction of unemployed workers were highly selective, i.e. they
demanded a price near the top of the oﬀer distribution to work. Once these workers managed
to ﬁnd a job within that range, they would be unlikely to improve upon that oﬀer, even if κ1
were high. In other words, allowing for the possibility of heterogeneous reservation prices makes
it possible for a large fraction of employment cycles to end after one job even when κ1 is high.
To integrate heterogeneity into our empirical analysis, we searched for a convenient paramet-
ric speciﬁcation for G (u) to facilitate the estimation. Recall that the model requires G (u) be
nondecreasing. Experimenting with diﬀerent speciﬁcations conﬁrmed that the best ﬁt is indeed
upward sloping, and moreover is convex. This prompted us to use an exponential form exp(u/b)
where b is some constant. However, for this speciﬁcation b plays a dual role: it determines both
the shape of the distribution of reservation prices in the support of the oﬀer distribution and the
fraction of workers whose reservation price is lower than w = F−1 (0). We therefore turned to a
two-parameter generalization, properly scaled to reﬂect a proper cdf:




This generalization is natural, since when a → 1 it collapses to the special case where all workers
have a reservation price below w (and is thus equivalent to assuming all workers share a common
reservation w∗ ≤ w as we previously did). From the Appendix, we know we can express Pr(N = n)
as an integral involving G (u) and κ1, and we choose the three parameters to maximize the likelihood
of the data given these expressions. Since the results proved sensitive to outliers, we eliminated
the extreme tail of the distribution and only included observations where N ≤ 7.
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports our estimates for κ1, a,a n db. Our estimates for κ1 by
education group range between 8.4 and 16.4. Our estimate for the population as a whole is 10.8.
Moreover, the point estimate for the population as a whole is quite tight, and we can safely reject
the lower estimates for κ1 we obtain when we assume workers share the same reservation price.
8More precisely, the implication is that the arrival rate of “viable” oﬀers — that is, oﬀers that a worker might
a c c e p t—i sl o w . T h i sr a t ei se q u a lt oλ1 (1 − F (w
∗)),w h e r ew
∗ denotes the common reservation price. Since we
assumed w = F
−1 (0) ≥ w
∗,t h i si se q u a lt oλ1. But this distinction hints at why heterogeneous reservation prices
c a nh e l p :e v e ni ft h ea r r i v a lr a t eo fv i a b l eo ﬀers is low for most workers, implying they won’t make it to a second
j o b ,t h er a t ea tw h i c ht h e yr e c e i v eo ﬀers that are deemed viable to any worker in the economy could still be high.
24Why does heterogeneity in reservation prices lead to higher estimates for κ1?F i g u r e 1 s h e d s
some insight on this. The ﬁgure plots the log of Pr(N = n) against n. The solid black line
represents the data. The dashed line represents the ﬁtted values when we assume all workers share
a common reservation price (i.e. when we constrain a =1 ). Matching the large fraction of cycles
with only one job requires a low value for κ1. However, as evident from the ﬁgure, a low value
of κ1 implies that the distribution for N has a thin tail, as reﬂected in the steep negative slope
of the dashed line. This is intuitive: if oﬀers arrive infrequently, few workers will make it to a
second job; of those that do, few will make it to a third job; and so on. Hence, Pr(N = n) should
decline sharply with n. But the empirical distribution has a much fatter tail: a non-negligible
fraction make it to a third, fourth, and ﬁfth job. This requires a high value κ1, since workers need
to receive enough oﬀers to have enough opportunities for this much upward mobility. When we
introduce heterogeneity in reservation prices, the estimation assigns a high value for κ1 to match
the fat tail of the distribution, and assigns a and b to match the large fraction of cycles with only
one job. In particular, it interprets the data to imply that a large fraction of workers who are so
selective that they will be unlikely to receive a more favorable oﬀer than the ﬁrst oﬀer they are
willing to take, even when the rate at which oﬀers arrive is quite high.
Interestingly, the estimates we obtain for κ1 when we allow for heterogeneity are compatible with
the estimates previous authors have found based on duration data. For example, Flinn (2002),
using the same NLSY dataset we use, estimates κ1 between 3.3 and 7.8 across education groups,
and for the group as a whole at 4.6 (see Table 4, p633). Using data from the Netherlands, van den
Berg and Ridder (1996) estimate κ1 between 6.8 to 12.3 across age groups, and for the group as a
whole at 9.4 (see Table VII, p1208). Although these estimates are consistent with what we ﬁnd,
they are based on independent evidence. Our results are driven by the fact that a fair number
of workers are observed in a large succession of jobs without a nonemployment spell, implying
that they must have received oﬀers at a fairly high rate to accumulate enough oﬀers to move this
many times. By contrast, estimates based on duration data are driven by the fact that higher
wage jobs have signiﬁcantly longer duration. Recall that the hazard rate for a job that pays a
price w corresponds to δ + λ1 (1 − F (w)). The extent to which the average duration varies with
the price paid on the job depends on how large λ1 is relative to δ. Even though previous authors
have imposed diﬀerent assumptions on F (·) and diﬀer in how they account for unobserved worker
productivity, the fact that higher wage jobs last longer leads all to estimate a high value for κ1.
While allowing for heterogeneous reservation prices leads to estimates of the arrival rate for em-
ployed workers that are consistent with what previous work has found, the nature of heterogeneity
in reservation prices we estimate leads to diﬀerent conclusions regarding the rate at which unem-
25ployed workers encounter oﬀers. In particular, to accord with the large fraction of employment
cycles that end after only one job, our estimation requires that the distribution of reservation
prices be highly skewed towards the upper support of the oﬀer distribution, as implied by the low
v a l u ew ee s t i m a t ef o rb in Table 2. Intuitively, if employed workers receive many oﬀers, as implied
by a high κ1, it must be that a large fraction of workers begin their ﬁrst job near the top of their
potential earnings distribution. But if a large fraction of workers are indeed this choosy, the rate
at which workers encounter oﬀers while unemployed must be fairly high to accord with the low
duration and incidence of unemployment we see in the data.9
The reason our estimates diﬀer from those in previous work is that we identify the distribution
of reservation prices from mobility data, whereas previous work has either abstracted from it or
parameterized it in a particular way, e.g. Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999). Our estimate
reveals a far more skewed distribution, and hence a far higher estimate for κ0 = λ0/δ,t h er e l a t i v e
rate at which workers encounter oﬀers while unemployed. To see this, substitute (4.4) into (4.7)





Rearranging, we get the following expression for κ0:






G0 (1) measures how skewed the distribution is towards the upper support of the oﬀer distribution.
If all workers share a common reservation price, G0 (1) = 1. By contrast, our estimate for G0 (1),
reported in the ﬁnal column in Table 2, is much larger: κ0 is almost 16 times as large as when
we assume all workers share the same reservation price. If we set u to 6%, our estimate for
λ0/λ1 = κ0/κ1 is 23, i.e. the rate at which oﬀe r sa r r i v ew h i l ew o r k e r sa r eu n e m p l o y e di so v e r
twenty times as large as when they are employed. By contrast, since previous work has either
abstracted from heterogeneity in reservation prices or considered far less skewed distributions
(where the implied G0 (1) is much smaller), it has typically estimated λ0/λ1 at no more than 2.
Why does our approach imply that workers receive oﬀers at a much lower rate when they are
employed than when they are unemployed? This interpretation is needed to explain why in the
data most workers move fairly quickly from unemployment to employment (as evidenced by the low
9Note that one could alternatively interpret these ﬁndings as saying that a large proportion of employed workers
receive oﬀers at a lower rate than their peers, rather than that a large proportion of workers are choosier than their
peers. If the ratio λ1/λ0 were constant across workers, this too would require that many unemployed workers receive
oﬀers at an extremely high rate to accord with the low incidence and duration of unemployment.
26incidence of unemployment) but do not often move from their ﬁr s tj o bo u to fu n e m p l o y m e n ti n t o
a second job (as evidenced by the high incidence of cycles that end with only one job). Within our
framework, the only possible explanation is that mobility slows down dramatically once workers
are employed. There may be some truth to this, but the magnitude seems rather large to be
plausible. More likely, our framework abstracts from some important consideration, and it is not
obvious how this feature would aﬀect our inference on the degree of labor market mobility.10
There are various features one could introduce into this search model that could explain these
facts without implying a dramatic decline in the arrival rate once a worker becomes employed.
One example is moving costs: even if employed workers receive oﬀers at a high rate, they may
not always move to a higher oﬀer. The problem with this explanation is that it also implies a
thin-tailed distribution for N, although this can be overcome if only some workers have a distaste
f o rm o v i n gr a t h e rt h a na l l . A n o t h e rp o ssibility is to endogenize search eﬀort, so that workers
who earn a wage closer to the top of the distribution search less intensively. In this case, the
number of oﬀers M would be correlated with the realizations {ym}
M
m=1, resulting in more spells
with only one job (those where the initial draw was high). This modiﬁcation poses problems for
recovering arrival rates using duration data, since high wage jobs would tend to last longer even if
the “true” arrival rate λ1 were low, simply because workers on high wage jobs search less. Thus,
the fact that high wage jobs have longer durations does not seem to robustly imply κ1 is high. By
contrast, if oﬀers are independent, the fat tail in the distribution of N necessarily implies a high
κ1: records are suﬃciently rare among i.i.d. draws that the number of oﬀers workers receive over
an employment cycle must be large, and hence so must κ1.
6. Heterogeneity and Identiﬁcation of the Oﬀer Distribution
In this section, we brieﬂy note some of the implications of heterogeneity in reservation prices for
estimating the oﬀer distribution F (·). Barlevy (2005) argued that in the NLSY data, average
log wage gains appear to be roughly constant regardless of how many jobs the worker previously
changed. In the absence of heterogeneity in reservation prices, this pattern uniquely characterizes
the exponential distribution, implying that the oﬀer distribution is Pareto (the antilog of the
exponential). By contrast, if the oﬀer distribution were lognormal, as is assumed at times, average
10H o w e v e r ,t h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c et os u p p o r tt h en o t i o no fh eterogeneity in reservation wages. In particular, such
heterogeneity would imply a positive relationship between the duration of an unemployment spell and the duration
of the ﬁrst job out of uneployment, since more selective workers will be unemployed for longer on average but are
then less likely to voluntarily leave for another job. Preliminary work we carried out revealed such a pattern in the
NLSY data, although a serious treatment of this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
27wage gains would decline with n, a feature that is due to the log concave shape of the normal
distribution. However, Barlevy (2005) found that the rate at which average wage gains decline
with n for a lognormal distribution is not suﬃciently sharp that it can be rejected statistically.
How does our interpretation of this ﬁnding change once we allow for heterogeneous reservation
prices? On the one hand, to the extent that log wage growth does not vary with the number of
times the worker has already changed jobs, we would still conclude that the oﬀer distribution is
Pareto. This follows directly from Proposition 3. However, distinguishing the Pareto distribution
and the lognormal distribution becomes more diﬃcult, as can be seen graphically in Figure 2.
T h ed a r kl i n ei nt h eﬁgure shows the implied average log wage gains under a Pareto distribution.
Regardless of whether there is heterogeneity, average wage gains will be constant and assume the
same value in both cases. The remaining two lines trace out E
¡
yL(n) − yL(n−1) | N ≥ n
¢
for n for
a lognormal distribution that is normalized so that average wage growth across all job changers
is consistent with what Barlevy (2005) estimates from the data. The dashed line is computed
for the estimate of κ1 from the top panel of Table 2 when we assume no heterogeneity, while the
gray line is computed using our estimates for G (u) in the bottom panel of Table 2. According to
these estimates, the average log wage gains decline even less rapidly with n, making it harder to
distinguish these two particular shape restrictions.
To understand why heterogeneity in reservation prices results in a ﬂatter proﬁle of average wage
gains over an employment cycle, note that when we observe a worker move multiple times, we can
infer he is probably not very choosy, or else he would have started with a high wage that he would
be unlikely to improve upon. But less choosy workers tend to earn lower wages on average. Since
under the lognormal distribution, log wage gains are higher on average for workers in lower wage
jobs, this will increase the average wage gains we would observe for workers who have already
moved several times. Hence, average wage gains will not fall as much with n as when there is no
heterogeneity in reservation prices. In fact, for even more skewed functions G (u), wage gains for
workers with some mobility can increase enough to result in a proﬁle that is not monotonic in n.
According to Proposition 3, for any G (u), we can in principle identify the shape of the oﬀer
distribution F (·). But since diﬀerences are less pronounced in the face of heterogeneity in reserva-
tion prices, we might need a much larger dataset to estimate average wage growth more precisely
enough to rule out certain functional forms. Since one of the goals of this paper is to enable
identiﬁcation in large datasets where employment histories are left-censored, though, it might be
possible to satisfy these data requirements using other datasets.
287. Conclusion
Standard approaches to estimating search models, as summarized in the recent survey article of
Eckstein and van den Berg (2005), either abstract from unmeasured variation in wages or impose
parametric assumptions to deal with them. This paper exploits the implicit record structure of sim-
ple search models and shows that these models remain nonparametrically identiﬁed when worker
productivity is measured imperfectly, even in the presence of initial condition problems. These
problems may arise because of censoring problems, or because workers set diﬀerent reservation
wages. Establishing this result required us to derive new results on records from observations that
are independent but not identically distributed, a model which has not been analyzed so far in the
statistics literature. Determining identiﬁcation in even more realistic search frameworks is likely
to require a more rigorous analysis of records drawn from an underlying sequence of observations
that fails to satisfy the classical i.i.d. assumptions. The particular i.n.i.d structure analyzed here,
and the tools we use to analyze it, hopefully represent a ﬁrst step towards this goal.
In addition, this paper documented two new empirical ﬁndings: (1) the majority of employment
cycles end after only one job; and (2) the distribution of the number of jobs per employment
cycle has a fat tail. Viewed from the perspective of the standard search model, the ﬁrst ﬁnding
suggests a sluggish labor market, at least among employed searchers, since we would expect to
see a fair number of workers moving on to at least a second job (namely those who drew wages
slightly above their reservation price). By contrast, the second ﬁnding suggests a ﬂuid labor
market, since it implies some workers do manage to accumulate a lot of job oﬀers. When we
consider a variation of the standard search model where workers diﬀer in their reservation values,
our estimation gives more weight to the second observation. Thus, we infer that the rate at which
employed workers receive oﬀers is high, in line with estimates that use job duration data. But our
approach also implies a much higher oﬀer arrival rate for unemployed workers than previous work,
perhaps implausibly so. Although we oﬀered some directions for modifying the model, properly
interpreting these facts remains as something that should be pursued more in future work.
29Table 1: Distribution of N across employment cycles
Cycles than began before 1982 and end with at least one of potential experience
Definition 1 Definition 2
N # of cycles Pr(N = n) # of cycles Pr(N = n)
1 7555 0.612 2732 0.690
2 2853 0.231 748 0.189
3 1125 0.091 250 0.063
4 471 0.038 126 0.032
5 172 0.014 48 0.012
6 87 0.007 25 0.006
7 38 0.003 13 0.003
8 20 0.002 7 0.002
9 13 0.001 6 0.002
10 4 0.000 0 0.000
11 0 0.000 1 0.000
12 3 0.000 2 0.001
Definition 1 - cycles are partitioned according to nonemployment spells
Definition 2 - cycles are partitioned according to quit/layoff and time to next jobTable 2: Estimates for κ1 and G(F
-1(.))
Sample κ1  ab Implied
size . ' (1)
No heterogeneity in reservation wages
All 12,341 1.963
0.028
   Educ < 12 3,054 1.911
0.056
   Educ = 12 3,715 1.978
0.052
   Educ ∈ (13,15) 3,273 2.188
0.060
   Educ > 16 2,299 1.707
0.058
Heterogeneity in reservation wages
All 12,341 10.768 0.191 0.051 15.926
1.7766 0.0350 0.0048 1.968
   Educ < 12 3,054 10.082 0.1875 0.0554 14.855
3.442 0.0752 0.0107 3.803
   Educ = 12 3,715 9.489 0.224 0.054 14.647
2.6549 0.0698 0.0079 2.942
   Educ ∈ (13,15) 3,273 16.385 0.145 0.042 20.324
6.1542 0.0536 0.0109 6.242
   Educ > 16 2,299 8.442 0.209 0.053 15.083
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all u ∈ (0,1). Without loss of generality, we proceed as if there also exist density functions g(x)=G0 (x)
and f (x)=F0 (x), even though their existence is not implied by Assumption 2.1. If either of these
f u n c t i o n sd o e sn o te x i s t ,w ec a na l w a y sd e ﬁne a new set of variables y0
m = F (ym) so that y0
1 has a uniform
distribution (which is absolutely continuous) and y0
m for m ≥ 2 has an absolutely continuous distribution
under Assumption 2.1. Since F (·) i sm o n o t o n i c ,w ec a nc o m p u t et h el i k e l i h o o do fr e c o r de v e n t si nt h e
original system using record events in the analogous system where all variables have absolutely continuous














since the former representation may not exist. In








Deﬁne q =1− p. From Bunge and Nagaraja (1991), we know that for n ≥ 2, the likelihood of at least n
records with values r1 through rn is given by
h(r1,...,rn ∩ N ≥ n)=f (rn)
qg(r1)




1 − qF (ri)
(7.1)
Integrating r2 through rn−1 yields the following expression for the joint likelihood of r1 and rn:






1 − qF (rn−1)
1 − qF (r1)
¶¸n−2 qg(r1)
1 − qF (r1)
f (rn)
and so









1 − qF (rn−1)
1 − qF (r1)
¶¸n−2
(n − 2)!Pr(N ≥ n)
qg(r1)





































E (|wn||N ≥ n) ≤
[−ln(1 − q)]
n−2











































¯ ¯dun < ∞where the last inequality follows from the assumption that E (|y2|) < ∞. Hence, E (|wn||N ≥ n) is well-
deﬁned. But for any random variable Y ,i fE (|Y |) exists then so does E (Y ). By a similar argument,
E (wn−1 | N ≥ n) can also be shown to exist, and hence so does E (wn − wn−1 | N ≥ n). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : We begin by proving part (a). Let q =1− p. Using Nagaraja and Barlevy
(2003), we can deduce that the likelihood of exactly n observed records with values r1 through rn is given
by
h(r1,...,rn ∩ N = n)=
(1 − q)g(r1)




1 − qF (ri)
.
Integrating out r2 through rn yields





















































































in (7.3) is independent of the function F (·).T o c o n -
sider the most general case, we allow g0 (u) to depend on the parameter q and we will write out g0 (u,q).


































for n =1 ,2,3,... We will show by contradiction that q1 = q2, which in turn implies that Pr(N = n) uniquely
determines p =1− q.
Set t = ln((1 − q1u)/(1 − q1)) on the left-hand side and t =l n( ( 1− q2u)/(1 − q2)) on the right-hand side















h1 (t) if t ≤−ln(1 − q1)
0 if t>−ln(1 − q1)




























2 ((q2 − q1)/[q2 (1 − q1)])
¤
, which violates Assumption 2.3. It follows that q1 and q2
must be equal.
We next establish (b). Using the likelihood function (7.1), changing variables and integrating out r2


















(n − 3)!Pr(N ≥ n)(1− qu1)(1− qun−1)
dundu1dun−1





F−1 (un) − F−1 (un−1)
¤
dun
and introduce the change of variables
t = −ln(1 − qun−1)
s = −ln(1 − qu1)
c = −ln(1 − q)
so the average record gap is given by
E (wn − wn−1 | N ≥ n)=
1

































E (wn − wn−1 | N ≥ n)=
1
(n − 3)!P (N ≥ n)
Z c
ω=0
ηF (ω)ωn−3dωNow, suppose there exist two functions F1 and F2 that give rise to the same sequence of expected record







The Müntz-Szász theorem then implies that for almost all ω ∈ (0,c),
ηF1 (ω)=ηF2 (ω)



















We next argue that (7.4) requires φ(t)=0almost surely. We ﬁrst appeal to yet another change in variables,
w = c − t and z = c − ω to rewrite (7.4) as
Z z
0






and b(x)=φ(c − x). Applying Theorem VII in Titchmarsh (1926), which is
identical to Theorem 151 from the more accessible Titchmarsh (1948, p. 324-5), there exists a c∗ such that
a(x)=0for all x ∈ (0,c ∗) and b(x)=0for all x ∈ (0,c− c∗). But by Assumption 2.3, there exists an ε>0
such that g0 (u) > 0 for all u ∈ (0,ε), and so there exists an ε0 such that a(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0,ε 0). It follows
that c∗ must equal 0, and hence b(z)=0for almost all z ∈ (0,c), which in turn implies φ(t)=b(c − t)=0
for almost all t ∈ (0,c).
Thus far, we have shown that for any two distributions F1 and F2 that give rise to the same sequence
of expected record gaps E (wn − wn−1 | N ≥ n),i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tφF1 (u)=φF2 (u) for almost all
u ∈ (0,1). The last step is to show that this implies F1 and F2 are identical almost surely up to a location






Our argument follows Nagaraja and Barlevy (2003). Since φF1 (u)=φF2 (u) almost surely, then for almost




















































2 (x) − F
−1
1 (x). Then we the above equation implies that for almost all u ∈ (0,1),
Z 1
u


























H(x)dx =l n ( 1− t) − ln(1 − s)




H(v)dv +l o g ( 1− t)=c
or Z 1
t
H(x)dx = e−c(1 − t),t ∈ (0,1).
Diﬀerentiating with respect to t,w eo b t a i nH(t)=e−c for all t ∈ (0,1),t h a ti sF
−1
2 (t) − F
−1
1 (t)=e−c for
almost all t ∈ (0,1), as we need to show. ¥






























































for all n =1 ,2,3,... As in the proof of Proposition 2, set t = ln((1 − q1u)/(1 − q1)) on the left-hand side











for all n =1 ,2,3,... Just as in the proof of Proposition 2, it follows that
q1 = q2
Next, since q1 = q2,t h ef a c tt h a t{q,F1,G 1} and {q,F2,G 2} both give rise to the same distribution










































































, and hence Pr(N = n) uniquely identiﬁes
G (u) as noted in the text.
Deﬁne g0 (u)=G0 (u). We then repeat the steps of the proof in Proposition 2 to argue that F (·) is




, it follows that for any
u ∈ (0,1),w eh a v eG−1 (u)=F−1 ¡
G−1 (u)
¢
. Hence, G−1 (·) can be identiﬁed up to the same constant as
F (·). ¥
Appendix B: Bargaining
In this section, we describe a particular bargaining game whose reduced form corresponds to the model in
our paper. We consider an alternating-oﬀer bargaining game along the lines ﬁrst proposed by Rubinstein
(1982): the worker and the ﬁrm alternate in proposing a schedule of payments the worker should receive
over the course of the job. More precisely, in line with the model we described, we require that the proposed
schedule assumes the form of a function w(z, it) that speciﬁes the worker receive a payment that is entirely
a function of his ability  it, although the amount can vary with the productivity z of the match. If a party
proposes a schedule and the other party accepts, production takes place and the worker is paid according
to this schedule. If the worker proposes a schedule that is rejected, the two parties must wait ∆w units of
time, after which the employer gets to propose his own schedule. If the employer proposes a schedule that





We will consider taking the limit as ∆w and ∆e tend towards zero while holding the ratio ∆e/∆w,a n d
hence β, ﬁxed. In the limit, it doesn’t matter whether the worker or the employer makes the ﬁrst oﬀer.
As emphasized by Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986), the outcome of the bargain depends cru-
cially on what we assume occurs while the parties wait between oﬀers. We assume the worker and the
employer bargain in real time, and thus discount the future at rate ρ. While they wait, the two may be hit
by a shock that causes them to separate (which recall arrives at a rate δ per unit time), and the worker
may continue to encounter other employers. Hence, if ∆ units of time have passed, where ∆ is small, there
is a probability of roughly δ∆ the two will have separated. Moreover, if we assume that a worker will
only change employers if the employer he encounters is more productive (i.e. bargaining leads to eﬃcient
mobility decisions), then there is a probability of roughly λ1 (1 − Γ(z))∆ that the worker would leave for
a more productive employer. Correspondingly, the probability the two will remain together and continue
with a counteroﬀer is approximately 1 − [δ + λ1 (1 − Γ(z))]∆. Finally, we assume that during the period
∆, the worker is unable to enjoy leisure. This assumption implies that all workers, regardless of their value
of leisure, will negotiate to the same wage. This is a reasonable assumption: workers who value their leisure
more will certainly be more choosy, but will probably not be able to use their higher value of leisure to
extract higher wages. In reality this is probably because the value of leisure is hard to verify, but rather than
use a model of bargaining with private information, it is simpler to assume workers cannot enjoy leisurewhile bargaining. Hall and Milgrom (2005) propose a similar scheme and argue it provides a plausible
description of actual wage bargaining.
Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) show that in the limit as ∆w and ∆e tend to 0, the schedule
w(z, it) solves the Nash bargaining problem
max
w(z, it)
[J (z, it) − J0]
1−β [W (z, it) − W0]
β (7.7)
where J (z, it) denotes the expected utility of an employer who employs a worker of ability   on a job with
productivity z, W (z, it) denotes the expected utility of a worker of ability   w h e nw o r k i n go naaj o bw i t h
productivity z,a n dJ0 and W0 denotes the expected utility of the employer and the worker respectively if
the two fail to come to agreement. Turning ﬁrst to J0, if the parties fail to agree, either the two will remain
together after ∆ units of time, in which case the utility of the employer will be J (z, it), or else the two will
have separated by then, in which case we assume the employer has a utility of zero (as would be implied by
a free entry condition). Discounting the future at the rate ρ,w eh a v e
J0 ≈
(1 − (δ + λ1 [1 − Γ(z)])∆)J (z, it+∆)
1+ρ∆
Similarly, after ∆ units of time, the worker will either be unemployed, in which case his utility is deﬁned
by the utility of an unmployed worker U, employed on a better job, which is associated with a utility of
E [W (z0,  it+∆) | z0 ≥ z], or else he will remain on the same match, which yields a utility of W (z, it+∆).
Hence,
W0 ≈
(1 − (δ + λ1 [1 − Γ(z)])∆)W (z, it+∆)+δ∆U + λ1 (1 − Γ(z))E [W (z0,  it+∆) | z0 ≥ z]
1+ρ∆







Hence, the wage oﬀered to a worker under this particular bargaining protocol will be proportional to his
output, and all workers face the same potential oﬀer distribution. Note that under this outcome a worker
would indeed switch jobs if and only if the employer he encounteres has a higher productivity z, in line with
our assumption. Hence, the wage schedule above represents a proper equilibrium. Since the wage it implies
is proportional to productivity, the distribution F (·) is once again identically equal to Γ(·) up to a scaling
factor, and so we can easily identify Γ(·) from F (·).
Finally, we should note that in recent work, Shimer (2005) examined bargaining in a similar model
with on-the-job search. His formulation, which borrows from Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986),
assumes the agents do not discount between oﬀers; rather, there is a constant rate that negotiations break
down, independently of how the worker ranks his current employer relative to other employers. Under this
alternative formulation, he shows that the wage schedule solves an analogous problem to (7.7), but with J0
replaced by 0 and W0 replaced by U. Shimer shows that when Γ(·) is a continuous distribution, there exist
equilibria in which all ﬁrms with the same productivity z e n du pa g r e e i n gw i t ht h e i rw o r k e r so nt h es a m e
wage. However, in his formulation worker productivity  it is assumed to be ﬁxed over time. Once we allow
for  it to vary over time, the solution w(z, it) that solves this alternative problem is typically not linear in
 it or separable in z and  it. Thus, his proposed scheme will typically not yield the model we describe as a
reduced form (except for particular processes  it). This underscores that while our model is consistent with
some models of wage determination, it is inconsistent with others.References
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